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Hilary Young*

The Scope of Canadian Defamation
Injunctions

Free speech is engaged when courts enjoin defamatory or allegedly defamatory
speech on an interlocutory or permanent basis. This paper explores the justifiable
scope of defamation injunctions and compares that to what courts do.
The study reveals that Canadian defamation injunctions regularly go far beyond
what is justifiable. For example, 16% of defamation injunctions involved orders not
to speak about the plaintiff at all, which is overbroad since that includes true and
otherwise lawful speech. Other orders prohibit saying disparaging (as opposed to
unlawful) things—again overbroad. Orders not to defame may be vague because
it is unclear whether, in context, a future publication will be defamatory. There are
narrow circumstances in which orders not to defame may be justified but such
orders are often made when a narrower injunction—or none at all—would be
appropriate.
La liberté d'expression est engagée lorsque les tribunaux ordonnent l'interdiction
d'un discours diffamatoire ou prétendument diffamatoire sur une base interlocutoire
ou permanente. Cet article examine dans quelle mesure les injonctions en matière
de diffamation sont justifiables et com-pare cela à ce que font les tribunaux.
L'étude révèle que les injonctions canadiennes en matière de diffamation vont
régulièrement bien au-delà de ce qui est justifiable. Par exemple, 16 % des
injonctions en diffamation consistaient en des or-donnances interdisant de ne pas
parler du tout du plaignant, ce qui dépasse la mesure puisque cela inclut des
propos vrais et par ailleurs légaux. D'autres ordonnances interdisent de dire des
choses dé-sobligeantes (par opposition à illégales), ce qui également dépasse
la mesure. Les ordonnances de non diffamation peuvent être vagues parce qu'il
n'est pas clair si, dans le contexte, une future publication sera diffamatoire. Il
existe des circonstances limitées dans lesquelles les ordonnances de non diffamation peuvent être justifiées, mais de telles ordonnances sont souvent rendues
lorsqu'une injonction de portée plus limitée voire aucune, serait appropriée.
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Introduction
This article assesses the appropriate and actual scope of injunctions in
Canadian defamation actions. While I argue that defamation injunctions
can be appropriate if narrowly tailored, the case law demonstrates that
unnecessarily broad and vague defamation injunctions are commonly
ordered in Canada.
Until recently, there was controversy in the United States as to
whether defamation injunctions—that is, court orders prohibiting speech
alleged or proven to be defamatory, or ordering its removal—were ever
constitutionally permissible.1 Canadian law has long permitted such
injunctions, especially where a court has found the speech to be defamatory,
while recognizing the potential threat they pose to freedom of expression.
Freedom of expression is an important Canadian value and receives

1.
David Ardia begins his paper on defamation injunctions by stating: “It has long been a fixture
of Anglo-American law that libel plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief; their remedies are
solely monetary” (“Freedom of Speech, Defamation and Injunctions” (2013) 55 W & Mary L Rev 1
at 4). The well-known phrase “equity will not enjoin a libel” is frequently cited. See e.g. Kramer v
Thompson, 947 F (2nd) 666, 677, 677 (3d Cir 1991); Erwin Chemerinsky, “Injunctions in Defamation
Cases” (2007) 57:2 Syracuse L Rev 157; Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation, 2nd ed (Toronto:
Thomson Reuters, 2012) at § 9:85;  Ann Motto, “‘Equity Will Not Enjoin a Libel’: Well Actually, Yes,
It Will” (2016) 11 Seventh Circuit Rev 271. Specifically, in the US, such injunctions are thought to be
a form of prior restraint prohibited by the First Amendment of the US Constitution. That said, there
is “an emerging modern trend” that permanent (as opposed to interlocutory) defamation injunctions
are permissible where they only prohibit the repetition of specific imputations that have been found to
be defamatory (McCarthy v Fuller, 810 F (3d) 456 at 464 (7th Cir 2015)). As we shall see, these are
Ardia’s Type IV injunctions.
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significant legal protection.2 And although the common law of defamation
is not subject to constitutional scrutiny in Canada, any restrictions on
expression by the courts should be justifiable.
There are several ways in which defamation injunctions can
unjustifiably interfere with free speech. They can be ordered in
inappropriate circumstances, provide inadequate guidance as to what not
to say, and can be broader in scope than necessary. This article addresses
these last two issues, which together reflect the appropriate scope of
defamation injunctions. The appropriate scope must be considered in light
of the internet’s ability to de-contextualize—for example, through search
engine results—and the ability of online statements to spread rapidly and to
persist. The way in which information flows is relevant to the permissible
scope of injunctions because speech initially published in one context may
be repeated in another, such that the meaning and effect of that speech may
be different. My research suggests that most cases in which an injunction
is sought involve digital communication.3
Certain kinds of injunctions are improper and should never be
ordered. Most obviously, overbroad injunctions that enjoin lawful as well
an unlawful speech should constitute legal error, reversible on appeal.
Unclear injunctions are also problematic, as the defendant is not put on
notice as to what speech is enjoined. This is considered in the context of
enjoining further “defamatory” statements. Yet the case law shows that
judges regularly order unnecessarily broad defamation injunctions and
sometimes order vague ones. This may be more likely where defendants
are self- or unrepresented.4
I conclude that injunctions prohibiting repeating imputations already
found to be defamatory, or requiring takedowns of such publications, are
sometimes justifiable. Particularly given the potential effects of internet
2.
For example, freedom of expression is protected in s 2(b) of Canada’s Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c
11). And while defamation law is not subject to Charter review, it must evolve in accordance with
Canadian values, including Charter values. Freedom of expression is therefore often explicitly
mentioned when judges make incremental changes to the law of defamation. See e.g. Grant v Torstar
Corp, 2009 SCC 61 at paras 42-57.
3.
As discussed in Section 3 below, I identified 54 cases between 2007 and 2017 in which defamation
injunctions were ordered and there was sufficient detail in the reasons to permit categorization. 44/53
of these, or 83 per cent, concerned publication on the internet. (The denominator is 53 because for one
case it was unclear whether internet publication was involved.) Another 6/53 (11 per cent) involved
email publication. Only 3/53 (6 per cent) involved neither. And while I cannot say what percentage
of defamation cases in that time frame generally involved online publication, a study of a cases from
2003-2013 showed only 14 per cent of cases involved internet publication and a further 9 per cent
involved email. See Hilary Young, “The Canadian Defamation Action: An Empirical Study” (2018)
95:3 Can Bar Rev 591 at 605.
4.
See page 24 below.
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publication, I also conclude that under certain narrow circumstances it
is justifiable to enjoin a defendant from further defaming the plaintiff.
However, injunctions granted in Canada regularly go far beyond these
justifiable circumstances.
I. Values in drafting injunctions: Minimal impairment and precision
It is important to get the scope of defamation injunctions right. Freedom of
expression is implicated, but so is the plaintiff’s reputation. To determine
the appropriate scope of injunctions, we must understand their purpose.
The main purpose of injunctions in defamation cases, whether they be
prohibitive (e.g. do-not-say-x orders) or mandatory (e.g. takedown orders),
is to prevent additional irreparable reputational harm. For mandatory
orders, the expectation must be that without such an order new audiences
will see the libel, either in its original location or because the statement
may spread more widely. For prohibitive injunctions, the expectation
must be that the injunction is necessary to prevent a new libel, including
a repetition. However, in these cases, judges should still consider the
necessity of making a speech-infringing order. Publishing a libel is already
unlawful, and if the threat of a damages award serves as a deterrent there
is no need to resort to injunctions and potential contempt proceedings.
Sometimes, however, injunctions are necessary to prevent reputational
harm.
In other words, injunctions seek to prevent future harm to reputation5
where such harm is likely and irreparable, and perhaps only where an
injunction would be effective.6 They are not punitive; they are not substitutes
for future defamation actions; and they cannot undo reputational harm that
has already occurred. The scope of injunctions should reflect this narrow
goal of preventing additional irreparable reputation harm.
Overbroad orders risk proscribing lawful speech and potentially
punishing speakers with penalties including imprisonment. While it may
be difficult to decide exactly how broad a particular order should be, the
5.
“It may be that the granting of an injunction should be distinguished from the assessment of
damages. The latter compensates for harm that has already occurred. The former, while relying on
publications that have already taken place, is directed to limiting the harm that has been done by
preventing prospective damage that has not yet taken place.” Canadian National Railway Company v
Google Inc, 2010 ONSC 3121 at para 13.
6.
I do not address in this paper the issue of whether injunctions should be ordered if they are likely
to be ineffective, but judges have sometimes disagreed about this. In Google Inc v Equustek Solutions
Inc, 2017 SCC 34 [Equustek], the dissenting judges would have refused to grant the injunction sought
in part because it would not be effective (at paras 77-79). And while there is a general rule that equity
should not support ineffective orders, the Ontario Court of Appeal refused to therefore simply “throw
up their collective hands in despair” whenever a libel is published on the internet (Barrick Gold Corp
v Lopehandia (2004), 71 OR (3d) 416 at para 75, 239 DLR (4th) 577 (ONCA) [Barrick Gold].
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principle that orders should be minimally impairing of speech is, I think,
uncontroversial. According to the Ontario and British Columbia Courts
of Appeal, “injunctive relief must be broad enough to be effective but no
broader than reasonably necessary to effect compliance.”7
In particular, orders should rarely enjoin lawful speech. This is not
because lawful conduct may not be enjoined,8 but rather because there is
no compelling reason to enjoin lawful speech—a narrower injunction is
usually available. The extent to which injunctions should enjoin unlawful
speech that isn’t the subject of litigation is discussed below. As a starting
point, however, orders should be as narrow as possible to achieve the
legitimate ends the injunction seeks to achieve.
In addition, injunction orders should be clear and precise. “Since
a breach of an injunction may have the consequences of a fine and
imprisonment, the language of an injunction should clearly set forth what
is prohibited.”9 Thus, for example, where it was not clear when a party
was supposed to make a payment ordered, failure to pay did not constitute
contempt.10
Scope issues are not limited to the breadth and precision of the order
itself but also include the application of injunctions to third parties and the
extra-territorial scope of injunctions. However, these issues are beyond
the scope of this paper.11 I focus here on the kind of speech an injunction
should prohibit, rather than where or to whom the order should apply.
II. Canadian defamation injunctions
I searched the defamation case law between 2007 and 2017 in all Canadian
provinces other than Quebec12 and identified cases in which an injunction
was granted.13 These included permanent and interlocutory injunctions,
7.
Cambie Surgeries Corp v British Columbia (Medical Services Commission), 2010 BCCA 396
at para 39, cited in Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 183 v Castellano, 2020
ONCA 71 at para 18 [Labourers’ International].
8.
See e.g. Doug Rendleman, “The Defamation Injunction Meets the Prior Restraint Doctrine”
(2019) 615 San Diego L Rev at 672: “An injunction may govern a defendant’s conduct that the civil
law doesn’t.”
9.
Campbell v Cartmell (1999), 104 OTC 349 (SCJ) at para 60, 1999 CarswellOnt 2967.
10. Skybound Dev Ltd v Hughes Properties Ltd, [1988] 5 WWR 355 at para 38, 24 BCLR (2d) 1
(BCCA). See also Dare Foods (Biscuit Division) Ltd et al v Gill et al (1972), [1973] 1 OR 637, 1972
CanLII 506 (ONSC).
11. Note, however, that the Supreme Court of Canada has recently showed itself willing to impose
injunctions with extra-territorial effect and injunctions that bind third parties. See Equustek, supra note
6.
12. Quebec has a civil law system and its defamation laws are somewhat different than those in other
provinces. Its case law was therefore excluded from the search.
13. The methodology was to search three different databases, Quicklaw, Westlaw and CanLII, using
search terms appropriate to those platforms. They usually included “defam” with an expander, ie,
defamation, defamatory, defaming, defamed. To gather preliminary data, the search terms “injunct”
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though most were permanent. This does not mean more permanent
injunctions are ordered than interlocutory ones. Rather, this likely reflects
a greater tendency to report final decisions than interlocutory ones. That
said, the very high threshold for obtaining an interlocutory injunction
in defamation cases14 may also be a factor. The data set consisted of 62
orders from 54 cases.15 These do not reflect all the orders that would
have been made during this time period because some cases with orders
would not have been reported, and some may have been reported without
mentioning the order or setting out its terms in sufficient detail to permit
categorization. Yet others may not have been caught by the search terms.16
While the data set is necessarily incomplete, there is no reason to think the
injunctions studied are not representative. The data set is therefore helpful
in assessing the kinds of orders that are made and their relative frequency,
though given the small size of the data set, caution is warranted.17
To analyze Canadian injunctions, I adopt a typology created by US
scholar, David Ardia, which categorizes injunctions based on differences
in both breadth and clarity.18 First, I set out Ardia’s typology of speech
injunctions, considering the justifiability of each kind in the Canadian
context. I then categorize Canadian defamation injunction orders according
to this typology. Finally, I consider whether Canadian injunction orders
are unnecessarily broad or vague. I found that in many cases, a narrower
and clearer injunction was possible and apparently appropriate.
Ardia identifies four types of defamation injunction:
• Type I is the broadest and prohibits the defendant from making
any statements at all about the plaintiff.19
• Type II prohibits making any defamatory statements about the
and “enjoin” (with expanders) were used. Each case was read and categorized, with duplicates and
false positives excluded.
14. Interlocutory injunctions in defamation should be granted only in the “rarest and clearest of
cases.” Canada Metal Co Ltd et al v Canadian Broadcasting Corp et al [1975], 7 OR (2d) 261 at para
2, 55 DLR (3d) 42 (Ont Sup Ct) [Canada Metal]. This rule has been “universally and consistently”
applied since Bonnard v Perryman and other nineteenth century cases: ibid at para 3.
15. Where a case resulted in orders of more than one type, according to David Ardia’s typology of
defamation injunctions, they were counted as distinct orders. There are many other ways of counting
orders and many orders had multiple terms. The purpose of counting in this way was to be able to
classify orders according to Ardia’s typology, which is described below.
16. The large number of false positives suggests the search terms were not too narrow.
17. Thus, for example, while I find that 15 per cent of injunctions in the data set were of one type
and 42 per cent were of another, we cannot at this point conclude either that that is true of Canadian
injunction orders generally or that the second type of orders is more than twice as prevalent as the first.
What we can say is that in this data set, which we have no reason to believe is not representative, the
second type of order was more than twice as frequent as the first.
18. Ardia, supra note 1 at 52.
19. Ibid.
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plaintiff.20
I divide this category into Type IIa and Type IIb.
o Type IIa enjoins any defamatory statements in the sense of
disparaging statements or those that satisfy the defamatory
meaning element of the tort.
o Type IIb prohibits statements that are defamatory in the
sense of satisfying all elements of the tort and none of the
defences.
Type III injunctions enjoin the publication of words with a
particular imputation, where that imputation has not been found
to be defamatory.21
Type IV prohibits making statements whose imputations have
been found to be defamatory.22

1. Type I
Type I, which prohibits all speech about the plaintiff, is obviously overbroad
as it enjoins not only unlawful speech but also lawful speech. For example,
it would prohibit the defendant from saying true things about the plaintiff,
such as telling people that the defendant had been engaged in litigation
with the plaintiff. It would even prohibit the defendant from retracting her
original libel. This is because saying that she was wrong all along and that
the original libel was untrue are statements about the plaintiff.
As a practical matter, it may be that the defendant would be found in
contempt of court only for speech that was actually defamatory, but this
cannot be assumed since lawful acts may be enjoined.23 Courts have noted
defamation law’s chilling effect and have made the law more defendantfriendly to prevent this effect. To proscribe all references to a plaintiff
risks chilling even lawful speech. The breadth of Type I injunctions results
in serious interferences with free speech. It is always feasible to craft a
narrower injunction without unreasonably risking a plaintiff’s reputation.
Type I injunctions should never be ordered.
And yet surprisingly, Type I injunctions are relatively common in
Canada. Of the 62 injunction orders in my data set, ten (16 per cent) were
Type I injunctions. For example, in Beidas v Pichler, Himel J. ordered the
following, which includes mandatory and prohibitive terms:

20.
21.
22.
23.

Ibid at 53.
Ibid at 54.
Ibid at 56.
See note 8 above.
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1. … an order until trial of this action prohibiting the defendants from
publishing any materials which may tend to identify the plaintiffs Beidas,
Davies and Pallister.
2. The defendants shall delete all references to Beidas, Davies or
Pallister from any publications to which the defendants have, or can
obtain access.24

The order is overbroad and was ultimately dissolved for that reason.25
If the defendants were to say: “I’m being sued by Beidas,” that would
violate the injunction, though it would obviously not be defamatory
because it does not impugn Beidas’ reputation and is true. Similarly,
saying “Jennifer Pallister died” would violate the order, even though it
is true and not defamatory. The defendants would also violate the order
if they refused to take steps to remove lawful content about the plaintiffs
from sites they have access to.
Lest one think this was simply a one-off mistake caught on appeal,
consider Craven v Chmura, in which the Ontario Superior Court turned
its mind to the scope of the injunction and found support in the case law
for Type I injunctions. Then, citing New York Fries, the court justified the
breadth of the injunction in Craven v Chmura “to avoid the cost and other
consequences of future litigation between the parties.”26
The order in New York Fries was as follows:
Consequently, the defendants shall be permanently restrained from
publishing or broadcasting, or causing to be published, broadcast or
otherwise disseminated, any statements or other communications
concerning New York Fries or any of its directors, officers or employees,
except if made in court documents or open court as required to litigate
Court File No. 1543/10 against New York Fries.27

That said, the Ontario Court of Appeal recently amended a Type I
defamation injunction on the basis that it was overbroad, stating that:
Absent evidence that prohibiting the appellant from making nondefamatory statements is reasonably necessary to address the identified
likelihood of future defamation, the injunction should not have been cast
24. See Beidas v Pichler (Legassé) (2008), 294 DLR (4th) 310 at para 40, 2008 CanLII 26255 [ON
SCDC).
25. A three-judge panel of the Ontario Superior Court agreed and dissolved the orders as being
too broad. They replaced them with an order enjoining the defendants from “in any way publishing,
continuing to publish or otherwise disseminating the article or statement known as ‘A Silhouette of
Doom’” (ibid at para 71). While narrower, this may still be too broad since the article presumably
contains lawful as well as unlawful speech.
26. Craven v Chmura, 2016 ONSC 2406 at para 20.
27. 122164 Canada Limited v CM Takacs Holdings Corp et al, 2012 ONSC 6338 at para 37.
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so broadly that it captured non-defamatory statements.28

In my view, this statement does not go far enough, since it implies that such
broad orders may sometimes be necessary to prevent future defamation.
I do not believe this is the case. Regardless, the circumstances in which a
Type I order would be necessary must be exceedingly rare. These orders
go far beyond what should be necessary to prevent unlawful reputational
harm to the plaintiffs. They would prevent all manner of true speech,
including speech on matters of public interest. The judge in Craven was
presumably concerned that the defendant would not be silenced and his
speech could not be predicted. He stated he was concerned about the costs
and inconvenience of future litigation. But if a defendant is not prepared to
abide by a narrower order (for example, a Type II “do not defame” order),
it is unclear why she would abide by a broader one. Further, enforcing
contempt orders is costly too. More importantly, the injustice of proscribing
legal speech is not justified by efficiency-based arguments. Although
Type I orders have the benefit of clarity, they are overbroad and should not
be permissible.
2. Type II
Type II injunctions are more defensible as they are limited to defamatory
speech about the plaintiff. They proscribe any further defamatory speech,
meaning speech not yet determined to be defamatory (unlike Type IV which,
as we shall see, is limited to speech already judged to be defamatory). This
might seem unproblematic, in that only illegal content will be enjoined.
There are, however, two potential problems with Type II injunctions: they
may be vague and are arguably overbroad.
While Ardia treats all injunctions prohibiting future defamation as
Type II, it is useful to distinguish between two kinds of Type II injunctions,
since they raise different issues.29 First, there are injunctions that enjoin
any further communications with disparaging or defamatory meaning,
regardless of whether other elements or defences are made out.30 I refer
to these as Type IIa. Alternatively, Type IIb injunctions prohibit future
defamation in the sense of making out the tort—satisfying all of the
elements and none of the defences. For reasons set out below, Type IIa
28. Labourers’ International, supra note 7 at para 20.
29. I am grateful to Norman Siebrasse for suggesting this approach.
30. While purists may consider this the only true meaning of defamatory, the word is commonly used
to refer both to the defamatory meaning element of the tort and to the tort itself. Given this, the term
on its own is ambiguous, much like “negligence” is. What’s more, the analysis of Type II injunctions
below reveals that judges differ in whether they mean defamatory in the sense of defamatory meaning
or in the sense of all of the elements and none of the defences being made out.
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orders are never defensible while Type IIb are at least arguably sometimes
defensible.
Where an order simply proscribes “defamatory” communications, it is
unclear whether this is a Type IIa or Type IIb order. This is because there
is an inherent ambiguity in the word “defamatory.” “Defamatory” can
mean that the tort of defamation is made out, or only that the element of
defamatory meaning is made out—that is, that the communication would
make an ordinary person think less of the plaintiff. This ambiguity is in
itself problematic as it does not put the defendant on notice as to what
conduct will breach the injunction. The ambiguity also makes enforcing
such an order challenging, as it is harder to prove the mens rea or intent
required for contempt when the order is unclear. Ambiguity was one
reason why the judge in Seikhon v Dhillon refused to order the requested
Type II injunction.31
Ambiguity is not the only problem. An order prohibiting disparaging
or defamatory (in the sense of defamatory meaning) communications is
overbroad. It captures lawful speech, including true speech, since truth is
a defence. Like Type I orders, this is problematic and easily avoidable in
most, if not all, circumstances and so Type IIa orders should effectively
never be made.
Given the ambiguity in the word “defamatory,” one might wonder
whether Type IIa orders actually exist. That is, we might give the benefit
of the doubt to judges that their Type II orders are all Type IIb orders that
enjoin the tort of defamation. In the study, 26/62 or 42 per cent of orders
were Type II, making it the most common type of injunction. While most
(19/26 or 73 per cent) Type II orders were ambiguous as to whether they
were Type IIa or Type IIb, it is clear that some orders are, indeed, Type IIa
orders.
For example, in Zall v Zall, an injunction was granted on the following
terms:

31.

Seikhon v Dhillon, 2017 BCSC 2525 at para 173:
Further, I have concerns about the form of the order sought, which would simply enjoin
Mr. Dhillon from “the publication or distribution… of any defamatory statements about…
the plaintiffs.” This language fails to make clear whether it would be a breach of the order
for Mr. Dhillon to publish a statement about the plaintiffs that would tend to lower their
reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person if that statement was true. In other words,
it is not clear, as proposed, whether it would be necessary to determine the truth of any
such statement in order to know whether the order had been breached. Ascertaining the
truth would almost certainly require a trial. In my view, this is likely to give rise to more
problems than it resolves, including protracted litigation about whether Mr. Dhillon is in
contempt of court in circumstances where he says something derogatory about the plaintiffs
but then pleads truth.
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1. The defendant, Tammi Zall, is enjoined and restrained from the
publication or distribution on the internet, or by any other method or
medium, of any defamatory statements about or referring in any other
way to the plaintiff, John Zall…
…
3. For the purposes of this order, “defamatory” means any publication
which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking members
of society or to expose a person to hatred, contempt or ridicule…32

A similar clause, clarifying that “defamatory” means “defamatory
meaning,” was found in Rodrigues v Rodrigues.33 Three other Type II orders
were clearly Type IIa orders.34 One enjoined “accusatory or disparaging
allegations,”35 another “disparaging” comments.36 Note that the latter
order was made following a discussion of an earlier order, which the judge
found vague because it referred simply to “defamatory” statements:
I asked counsel in argument whether it was possibly ambiguous to use
the term “defamatory”. That is a term that is very meaningful to lawyers
and judges, and has a legal meaning as a term of art. Not everyone knows
that our law of defamation provides a true statement can be defamatory,
and that whether it is true or not is part of the consideration of whether
there is a defence to the defamation.37

This suggests an awareness of the problem with vague orders, but not the
problem of enjoining disparaging but lawful speech, such as statements
that are true, privileged or fair comment.
Thus, 7/26 Type II orders (27 per cent) were identifiable as Type IIa
orders. This amounts to 13 per cent of all orders in the data set.
The other 19/26 (73 per cent) of Type II orders, which enjoin
defaming the plaintiff, are ambiguous,38 but let us assume that they are
Type IIb orders that enjoin committing the tort of defamation. They are
32. Zall v Zall, 2016 BCSC 1730 at para 99.
33. Rodrigues v Rodrigues, 2013 ABQB 718 at para 49.
34. See Gee Nam John et al v Byung Kyu Lee et al, 2009 BCSC 1157 [Gee Nam John] at para 2;
Passey v Henry, 2016 BCSC 1766 [Passey] at para 26; Hutchens v SCAM.COM, 2011 ONSC 56 at
para 105. In addition, two others were type IIa because they enjoined “false or malicious” statements
rather than unlawfully defamatory ones. See Kim v Dongpo News, 2013 ONSC 4426 [Kim] at para 63;
Emerald Passport Inc v MacIntosh, 2008 BCSC 1289 at para 6.
35. Gee Nam John, supra note 34 at para 2.
36. Passey, supra note 34 at para 26.
37. Ibid at para 22.
38. Surprisingly, given the inherent ambiguity in the words “defamation” and “defamatory,” and
given the need in enjoining conduct to be clear about what is prohibited, none of the Type II orders
specified that they enjoined defamation in the sense of satisfying all the elements and none of the
defences.
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essentially do-not-defame orders or “obey the law” orders. They prohibit
future instances of the tort of defamation against the plaintiff, including
statements that were unrelated to the one that was litigated and which
were not foreseeable. Given that defamation is unlawful, some might
think such orders unproblematic. However, they transform what would
otherwise be tortious conduct into civil or criminal contempt. For this
reason, Ardia, Chemerinsky and Rendleman, discussing US law, view
Type IIb injunctions as impermissible prior restraints on speech.39 As
discussed below, however, they are sometimes, though rarely, justifiable
in the Canadian context.
As noted above, Type IIb orders are vague, in that what is defamatory
is notoriously difficult to assess in advance.40 Allegations may not be
defamatory if they are true, if they lack credibility, if they were published
responsibly or if they were privileged. Thus, the same words might be
defamatory in one context (e.g. published in a newspaper) and not in another
(e.g. spoken in the House of Commons). To know what is defamatory, and
what they are therefore enjoined from saying, defendants may need to
know how their speech will be interpreted by ordinary people, whether it
can be proven to be true (as opposed to whether they believe it to be true),
whether they took sufficient steps to verify before publishing, or whether
publication was on an occasion of privilege. Contempt of court requires
that intent to violate the order be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This
only means, however, that defendants must have spoken deliberately with
knowledge of the existence of the order. They need not have knowingly
breached the order.41 Vague orders are therefore problematic and should
be avoided unless absolutely necessary. In the US context they are likely
unconstitutional: Ardia cites Chief Justice Hughes of the United States
Supreme Court as stating that Type II injunctions are the “essence of

39. For Ardia see Ardia, supra note 1 at 53-54. Chemerinsky considers all defamation injunctions
that prevent future speech to be constitutionally impermissible in the United States, see Chemerinsky,
supra note 1 at 173. For Rendleman, see Rendleman, supra note 8 at 674: “A court today ought to
rule that a “no-defamation” injunction is both too broad and too vague. It forbids the defendant’s
expression that had not already been found to be defamatory, and it provides the defendant with
insufficient notice of expressions that would violate it.”
40. While a Type II order need not, in theory, involve future publication, where the issue is taking
down content already published, the order tends to be specifically aimed at that publication, rather than
at defamatory statements generally.
41. “The core elements of civil contempt are knowledge of the order and the intentional commission
of an act which is in fact prohibited by it.” Robert Sharpe, Injunctions and Specific Performance, 5th ed
(Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2017) at 6-18. For criminal contempt, there must be “intent, knowledge
or recklessness as to the fact that the public disobedience will tend to deprecate the authority of the
court.” Ibid at 6-4.
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censorship,”42 and Chemerinsky refers to “deep-seated American hostility
to prior restraints.”43
Consider, for example, the permanent injunction in Barrick Gold v
Lopehandia. It prohibits the defendants from: “disseminating, posting
on the Internet or publishing further defamatory statements concerning
Barrick or its officers, directors or employees.”44 It does not just prohibit
communicating the imputations that have been found to be defamatory. It
prohibits all future libels. Usually, plaintiffs must sue in relation to new
libels, since the usual procedure and remedy for defamation is a tort action
and damages rather than contempt of court and fines or a prison sentence.
Thus, if an “obey the law” order is justifiable, it must be because it is
necessary and there is presumably no less speech-infringing way to achieve
the desired end. This is sometimes thought to be the case where there is
a likelihood that the defendant will continue to defame, in unpredictable
ways,45 despite having been held liable and despite the prospect of future
tort liability. While a plaintiff could bring another defamation action
in such circumstances, this has costs and litigation may already have
proven ineffective, in that the defendant is judgment-proof or outside the
jurisdiction. Some judges have considered Type IIb injunctions necessary
because impecunious defendants will not be deterred by the possibility of
further litigation and damages awards that they cannot pay.
For example, in one case, the judge justified a Type IIb injunction as
follows: “Mr. Zakharia’s conduct establishes the likelihood that he would,
absent a permanent injunction, continue to defame the plaintiffs. There is
also the real possibility that the plaintiffs will not realize on their respective
awards.”46 In another case, the judge stated:
it is very likely that the defendant will continue to publish defamatory
statements despite the finding that he is liable to the plaintiffs for
damages…
This likelihood is justified on the basis that despite having an
interim injunction in place requiring the defendant to remove certain
specified defamatory statements from his internet blog and enjoining
him from publishing further defamatory statements about the plaintiffs,
42. Ardia, supra note 1 at 54 citing Near v Minnesota, 283 US 697 (1931) at 713.
43. Chemerinsky, supra note 1 at 166.
44. Barrick Gold, supra, note 6 at para 78.
45. The existence of unpredictability is what might justify a Type IIb order rather than a Type IV
order, enjoining the repetition of specific imputations found to be defamatory. The Ontario Court of
Appeal in St. Lewis v Rancourt, 2015 ONCA 513 [St. Lewis] may have had unpredictability in mind
when it referred to “a campaign of defamation and a likelihood that it will continue,” which would
justify a “broad ongoing injunction” (at para 16).
46. British Columbia Recreation and Parks Association v Zakharia, 2015 BCSC 1650 at para 98.

298 The Dalhousie Law Journal
he failed to remove the specific defamatory statements... Furthermore,
he made new defamatory statements in a blog posting on the internet
against the same plaintiffs only a few days before the hearing of this
matter.47

The question is whether the likelihood of further defamation, in
unpredictable ways, justifies a Type IIb order. As noted above, in the US
the answer has tended to be “no.”
In my view, Type IIb injunctions are sometimes justified, but only
in narrow circumstances. First, the conditions for any equitable relief
should obviously be satisfied. For interlocutory orders, this includes the
likelihood of irreparable harm.48 Permanent injunctions must be necessary,
meaning there are no adequate alternative remedies,49 and there is likely
to be continued wrongdoing: “A wrong committed in the past that has
little or no chance of continuing does not need to be remedied by an order
enjoining future behavior.”50 Second, such injunctions should be as narrow
as possible in scope.51
Given this, to justify an injunction, the scope of anticipated further
defamation must be different than that already litigated—otherwise
a narrower Type IV order, which requires a defendant not to repeat the
specific imputations already found to be defamatory, would be appropriate.
It must also be unpredictable, or else a narrower Type III injunction would
be more appropriate. Finally, it should be the case that the threat of further
litigation would not deter the defendant from defaming. This will usually
be because defendants are judgment-proof but it could also be that they
are sufficiently wealthy to pay any damages award, including an order
for punitive damages. The possibility of contempt prevents wealthy
defendants from effectively purchasing a license to defame.
To these existing requirements I would add that the predicted future
defamation should not only be defamatory (in the Type IIb sense of contrary
to defamation law, including defences). It should also be likely to cause
serious harm. This requirement, as applied to Type IIb injunctions, would
help ensure the judge turns her mind to whether the defendant is merely an
annoyance to the plaintiff or whether he is credible and risks doing serious
reputational harm. While Canadian defamation law does not require serious
harm (unlike English defamation law),52 the potential chilling effect of a
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Lord Selkirk School Division et al v Warnock, 2015 MBQB 195 at paras 53-54.
RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311, 111 DLR (4th) 385.
Nalcor Energy v NunatuKavut Community Council Inc, 2014 NLCA 46 at para 65.
Ibid at para 56.
Ibid at para 65.
Defamation Act 2013 (UK), c 26, s.1.
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broad “do not defame” order is such as to warrant additional safeguards
on the remedy. If the defendant is unlikely to cause serious harm through
future publication of libels, the remedy of an injunction should not be
invoked to restrict the defendant’s right to speak. It is therefore my view
that the law should evolve so as to require likely serious harm before
speech injunctions should be ordered.
Publication on the internet may result in serious harm, but it should not
always be inferred that serious harm will result solely because something
is published on the internet. Courts often exaggerate the harmful effects
of internet defamation on reputation.53 Publication on the internet does
not inevitably lead to widespread and perpetual dissemination, nor is it
necessarily credible and what is not credible does not threaten reputation.54
Nevertheless, publication on the internet creates at least the potential for
dissemination that is broad, in both time and space, in ways that were
not previously technologically feasible. In addition, search engines help
decontextualize online content and may more readily connect a libel to an
individual. Thus, internet publication may help justify the need for a Type
IIb injunction. This is not to suggest that it is sufficient to warrant such an
injunction.
For example, many of the defendants who would be subject to Type
IIb injunctions are not credible precisely because they make a wide range
of unrelated and unpredictable defamatory statements. While on their face
these statements may allege serious impropriety, all things being equal, the
more varied the allegations a defendant makes against a plaintiff, the less
credible they will be. This is true regardless of whether publication is on
the internet. Courts should carefully consider whether such allegations are
actually a threat to the plaintiff’s reputation. Courts are often not inclined
to seriously consider issues of credibility and persuasiveness in assessing
whether disparaging remarks are defamatory.55 Barrick Gold v Lopehandia
is an example in which a narrowly tailored injunction would likely not
have been effective, given the wide range of allegations made. However,
in my view, the accusations were not credible and thus not defamatory
precisely because the defendant was accusing Barrick Gold of “fraud
bigger than Enron,” genocide, misrepresentation to government officials,
arson, attempted murder, and manipulating world gold prices.56
53. For example, I find convincing Robert Danay’s article, “The Medium is Not the Message:
Reconciling Reputation and Free Expression in Cases of Internet Defamation” (2010) 56 McGill LJ 1.
54. See e.g. Hilary Young, “But Names Won’t Necessarily Hurt Me: Considering the Effect of
Disparaging Statements on Reputation” (2011) Queen’s LJ 37.
55. Ibid at 1-37.
56. Barrick Gold, supra note 6 at paras 15-16; see also Young 2011, supra note 54 at 14-15.
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I have suggested that for a Type IIb injunction, there should be a
likelihood of future defamation, the anticipated imputation(s) should be
unpredictable and different than those already litigated, and there should
be no adequate alternative remedies. This simply reflects the existing rules
governing equitable remedies. I have additionally suggested that the law
should evolve to require serious harm, and this would not be satisfied
solely on the basis of online publication.
Yet Type IIb injunctions are regularly ordered in circumstances in
which these requirements are not met. As noted above, they constituted
19/26 (73 per cent) of Type II injunctions or 19/62 (31 per cent) of all
injunctions in my study. They were the most common type of injunction.
I examined each Type II injunction to see whether the criteria above
(excluding serious harm, since the law does not require it) were made
out. I wanted to know whether a narrower order could reasonably have
been drafted. Because these determinations are subjective and, in my case
based solely on the reasons for judgment, I erred on the side of finding
the broader injunction to be justified. Specifically, I categorized each of
the 26 Type II injunctions as either one in which a narrower injunction
could clearly have been crafted, or one in which it was less clear that a
narrower injunction could have been crafted. I categorized conservatively,
placing any case in which a wide range of defamatory statements had been
made in the latter category unless it seemed there was no likelihood of
repetition.57 When in doubt, I assumed an injunction was appropriate and
simply focused on whether the scope of the injunction could be narrowed.
Of course, it is always the case that a narrower injunction is possible.
For example, Type IV injunctions are limited to the specific imputations
found to be defamatory. But again, the point was to see whether, if one
thinks Type II (that is, IIb) injunctions are justifiable where it is hard to
predict how the defendant will continue to defame, these particular Type II
injunctions are justified.
I found that 14/26 (54 per cent) of Type II orders could easily and
reasonably have been narrowed to enjoin the repetition of specific
imputations. For the other 12/26 (46 per cent), it was either difficult to say
or there was a range of defamatory imputations at issue.
An example of a clearly unnecessary Type II injunction is that in
Michie:
Jodi Lynn Guthrie-Waters a.k.a. Jodi Lynn Michie is hereby restrained
from publishing, or causing to be published, on the internet or by any other

57.

See e.g. Farallon Mining Ltd v Arnold, 2011 BCSC 1532 at paras 74, 116.
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method or medium, whether by name, pseudonym, address, photograph
or other means of identity, any defamatory statement referring in any
way to James Alexander Michie.58

In this case, the defendant had published one specific allegation (that her
husband had committed fraud) by e-mail to one person who had, at the time
of publication, already published an article containing the same imputation.
The court found this warranted damages of only one dollar. 59 The court did
not mention any evidence of likely repetition, nor was there any issue of
content removal, since publication was by e-mail. Based on information
available in the judgment, the test for any permanent injunction was not
met. But even if it were, the fact that there was a single narrow imputation
made by the defendant, and no evidence of likely repetition, means that a
Type IIb injunction was not justified.
Another example is the order in Kim v Dongpo News. In this case, a
journalist was found liable for defaming the plaintiff in an article. The libel
related to a description of a specific altercation and resulting lawsuit. As
such, any order could have been restricted to specific imputations already
held to be defamatory (i.e. a Type IV injunction). Further, there was no
indication of a likelihood of repetition of this libel, let alone of any others.
On the contrary, there was a partial correction and an attempt to remove
the incorrect content from the internet.60 As with Michie, based on the
information in the judgment, no injunction should have been granted at all
but certainly one could have been more narrowly tailored to the kind of
imputations the impugned publication made.
Examples where the resort to Type II injunctions is at least arguably
justifiable include Griffin v Sullivan:61
[35] Included in the many statements published by the defendant of and
concerning the plaintiff, are statements which I find convey the following
meanings:
(a) that the plaintiff has verbally abused many persons and has
enjoyed doing so;
(b) that the plaintiff is a sadist who likes to see young girls and
women cut and bleeding;
(c) that the plaintiff is “a sexual psychopath”;
(d) that the plaintiff has abused many women, both physically and
mentally;
(e) that the plaintiff is mentally disordered;

58.
59.
60.
61.

Michie v Guthrie-Waters, 2012 BCSC 793 at para 61.
Ibid at para 60.
Kim, supra note 34 at para 56.
Griffin v Sullivan, 2008 BCSC 827 at paras 35-36.
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(f) that the plaintiff is a liar;
(g) that the plaintiff is “true evil”;
(h) that the plaintiff is a coward;
(i) that the plaintiff has committed criminal offences in Canada
and in the United States, and is being investigated by the police for
offences in the United States, Canada and Australia;
(j) that the plaintiff offered to help a woman to commit suicide by
cutting her throat;
(k) that the plaintiff made death threats and threats of violence to
other persons;
(l) that the plaintiff is a predator who stalks and harasses people
over the internet, many of whom are vulnerable and suicidal;
(m) that the plaintiff is an alcoholic and a user of illegal drugs;
(n) that the plaintiff is dangerous and poses a risk to persons living
in the United States;
(o) that the plaintiff has committed the crimes of forgery, fraud and
extortion; and
(p) that the plaintiff is a paedophile, a sexual pervert, a sexual
predator and a date rapist.
[36] In my opinion, all of the above meanings conveyed by the
statements published by the defendant are defamatory of the plaintiff,
in their natural and ordinary meaning. The plaintiff testified that all of
these imputations were false, but did admit that he suffered mental stress
requiring treatment.

While it is possible to craft a Type IV injunction enjoining repeating
these imputations, the breadth of allegations and evidence that the
defendant is likely to continue defaming in the absence of an injunction
may justify a Type II injunction. As noted above, however, I would like to
see a serious harm threshold met before Type II injunctions are granted.
3. Type III
Type III injunctions are narrower than Type I and Type II but are still
overbroad. Recall that these are orders not to say x, where x has not been
found to be defamatory. For example, they may require a whole website
to be taken down when only part of the site is defamatory. Or they may
enjoin publication of an imputation not yet found to be defamatory. All
interlocutory injunctions that refer to specific imputations (as opposed to
enjoining defamatory speech or all speech about the plaintiff) are Type III.
Like Type I they may capture lawful speech and like Type IV, discussed
below, they do not reflect the fact that the law is highly context-dependent,
such that the same imputation may be defamatory in one context and not
in another.
There is little, if any, justification for permanent Type III orders which
enjoin speech not found to be defamatory despite an adjudication on the

The Scope of Canadian Defamation Injunctions

303

merits. If an imputation is alleged to be defamatory and is sought to be
enjoined, it should be proven to be defamatory before it is permanently
enjoined. If the risk is of future libels, the order can be narrowed to refer
to defamatory imputations—either Type IIb or Type IV. Interlocutory Type
III injunctions are more justifiable, but the very high threshold for such
injunctions should nevertheless be met.62
Type III injunctions effectively presume that a particular imputation
will be defamatory if published in the future, regardless of the context, but
this need not be established for an order to have been violated. Caution is
therefore warranted. One cannot assess whether something is defamatory
from words or their imputations alone. Context is vitally important. A
statement thought to be false today may turn out to be true tomorrow.63
A statement that is libelous when spoken at a press conference may be
privileged when spoken in the Legislature. A statement made by a notorious
liar may not be credible while the same words spoken by a respected public
figure may be devastating. Context is even more important now that a
defence of responsible communication is available. In such circumstances,
liability may be avoided because of the defendant’s due diligence,
regardless of what imputations were made. All this to say, permanent
Type III injunctions are problematic because they assume that a court can
determine in advance, and without any context, whether a statement will
be defamatory. This is simply false. However, the one advantage of Type
III orders over Type II orders is that they give the defendant notice of what
they must not say. Thus, where a specific imputation is predicted, and it
would be defamatory in most contexts, a Type III injunction may be the
least speech-restrictive, yet effective, order. Yet even then, the court should
be convinced: a) of the likelihood of publication; b) that irreparable harm
would result; c) and that the statement would be defamatory, in the sense
of all elements and no defences being made out, in the context in which it
is likely to be published. This comes close to an order not to defame, like a
Type IIb order, except that it is specific to particular imputations.
Type III injunctions were rare in the reported decisions: 9/62 or 15 per
cent. Palen v Dagenais included the following term:
(1) Pending judgment at trial or until further order of this court, the
defendant Arthur Dagenais is hereby prohibited and enjoined from:
(a) making further criminal or discipline complaints against Palen
to any authorities provided such complaints stem from the vehicle
62. Canada Metal, supra note 14.
63. More likely, a statement that was always true but could not be proven to be true in one case may
be proven to be true in another.
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inspection on October 26, 2007; and
(b) making accusations to anyone that Palen assaulted him using a
taser device or attempted to murder him on that date;…64

This order is much narrower than many others discussed in this
article and it should be noted that the plaintiff had sought a Type II
injunction. However, the judge considered that too broad because the
original publication was limited to “police circles,” because of the speechinfringing nature of a Type II injunction and because of the difficulty of
wording the order so that the defendant knows what is prohibited.65
And yet the ordered injunction was still unnecessarily broad. The
relevant defamatory statements were that a police officer assaulted
and attempted to murder Dagenais. The order enjoins all allegations of
criminality and discipline complaints arising from the vehicle inspection,
not only that the officer tried to assault/taser/kill the defendant. As such it
includes specific imputations not found to be defamatory.
Another Type III injunction was even more problematic from a
freedom of expression perspective. The judge in Henderson v Pearlman
made the following order:
Accordingly, I enjoin the defendants from publishing or republishing:
(a) any material in the specified articles;
(b) any material derived from those articles;
(c) any material pertaining to, or referencing those articles;
(d) any information relating to the status, lifestyle, personal
activities or business of the plaintiff; and
(e) any other information that is defamatory of the plaintiff.66

In addition to including a Type IIb term, the order enjoins the entire
content of articles and material pertaining to articles, not just their
defamatory content. It also includes all information “relating to the status,
lifestyle, personal activities or business of the plaintiff.” On its face this
includes information that does not have a defamatory meaning, and
defamatory information that is defensible because it is true, for example.
The order is unjustifiably broad.
4. Type IV
Type IV is the narrowest and least problematic type of injunction. It is
like Type IIb in that Type IV injunctions only enjoin defamatory speech.
However, such injunctions are narrower in that they enjoin only specific
64.
65.
66.

Palen v Dagenais, 2012 SKQB 383 at para 40.
Ibid at para 36.
Henderson v Pearlman, 2009 CanLII 43641 at para 55, [2009] OJ No 3444.
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words or imputations already found to be defamatory rather than the entire
scope of what would be defamatory of the plaintiff. Thus, with mandatory
Type IV orders, unlike Type IIb orders, there is no uncertainty about whether
the publication is defamatory in context because a court has already ruled
on this. With prohibitive orders, there is still a possibility that what was
found defamatory in one context is not defamatory in another.
In the American context, Type IV usually refers to orders not to repeat
the specific words or imputations held to be defamatory. Because he
focuses on prior restraint, Ardia does not seem to include, within Type IV,
orders to take down, remove or delete defamatory speech that has already
been published.
Ardia, while not necessarily opposed to Type IV (do not repeat)
injunctions, notes that they may still be overbroad. His concern relates
to how the defamatory imputation is defined. He provides an example
from Griffis v Luban in which enjoining the imputation that the plaintiff
was a liar was unnecessarily broad because it was not limited to lying in
the particular context of the defamation litigation – in this case, whether
the plaintiff had lied about her credentials as an Egyptologist. It could
be, for example, that the plaintiff did or will lie about something else.67
Prohibiting the defendant from calling the plaintiff a liar in any context is
therefore too broad.
But this problem is not inherent to Type IV injunctions. If orders are
well-crafted so as to make clear that they enjoin only the repetition of the
litigated defamatory imputations, perhaps only in circumstances in which
they remain libelous, the overbreadth objection disappears.
Doug Rendleman essentially argues in favour of Type IV injunctions.68
Chemerinsky, as noted above, considers all defamation injunctions
prohibiting future speech to be unconstitutional in the US. Specifically, he
considers Type IV injunctions involving future rather than past speech to
be unconstitutional because they’re ineffective: “Any effective injunction
will be overbroad, and any limited injunction will be ineffective.”69 While
I agree that Type IV injunctions may sometimes be ineffective, there are
other situations in which the defendant is likely to repeat her libel, or in
which a publication found to be defamatory should be taken down, and
an injunction could be effective. Since I have suggested that Type IIb
injunctions are sometimes necessary and should therefore be permissible,
67. Ardia, supra note 1 at 57, citing Griffis v Luban, No CX-01-1350, 2002 WL 338139, (Minn Ct
App Mar 5, 2002).
68. Rendleman, supra note 8 at e.g. 675.
69. Chemerinsky, supra note 1 at 171.
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that must also be true of narrower Type IV injunctions, under similar
circumstances.
To be clear, such injunctions should not be ordered as a matter of course
where there is a finding of liability. The usual remedy for defamation is
damages, not injunctive relief.70 However, Type IV orders are minimally
impairing. The main risks are that the injunction was unnecessary, because
there was no harm of repetition, or that the same words or imputations,
when published in a different context, will no longer be defamatory. In
the former case the injunction is unlikely to be breached, and so the only
harm is a chilling effect, rather than subjecting the defendant to contempt
proceedings.
The latter risk raises the issue of whether one should be found
in contempt for repeating an imputation that was earlier found to be
defamatory, but that is not actually defamatory in the context of the
repetition. For example, if between the time the injunction was ordered
and the imputation was repeated, it became clear that the imputation found
to be defamatory was in fact true, the order would be breached though the
second publication is not defamatory. In my view, such repetition does, but
should not violate the order.
A way to avoid that outcome is to make it an implicit or explicit term
of the order that the repetition itself be defamatory. This could complicate
contempt proceedings since there may be uncertainty as to what is
defamatory, and it could be said that the defendant had insufficient notice
of what she was not allowed to say. However, given that publishing only
particular imputations is enjoined, the risk accompanying such injunctions
is small.
For Type IV injunctions, as for Type IIb, there should be a likelihood of
repetition (i.e. necessity), damages should be inadequate, and there should
be the prospect of serious reputational harm. Unpredictability in what
kinds of allegations the defendant will make is not necessary with Type IV
injunctions since the scope of such orders is limited to imputations found
to be defamatory.
Some courts have framed the rule around permanent injunctions71 in
defamation as requiring a likelihood the libel will be repeated, despite
70. The primacy of damages is reflected in the fact that there is an entitlement to damages, while
equitable relief is discretionary. For equitable relief, the harm must be irreparable, which is another
way of saying that damages must be inadequate. “The very first principle of injunction law is that
prima facie you do not obtain injunctions to restrain actionable wrongs, for which damages are the
proper remedy” (London and Blackwell Rly Co v Cross, (1886) 31 Ch D 354 per Lindley LJ, 2 TLR
231).
71. I refer only to permanent injunctions since Type IV will necessarily be permanent injunctions.
Strictly speaking this is not true, as a temporary order could be made after a finding of liability. But
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a finding of liability, or a “real possibility” the plaintiff will not recover
damages.72 I am opposed to the rule that permits anti-speech injunctions
based solely on impecuniosity.73 For present purposes, however, I will
simply say that a likelihood of repetition, despite a finding of liability,
should always be required. So too should serious and irreparable
harm. Given the way that content on the internet can spread and be decontextualized by search engines, internet publications will often satisfy
these criteria for a Type IV takedown order. So too, of course, may offline
publications.
Type IV injunctions made up 17/62 or 27 per cent of injunctions. For
example, in Awan v Levant, the court ordered that: “[t]o the extent that
I have found the words complained of to be defamatory, they should be
taken down from the defendant’s website.”74 While the judge seemed
attuned to the need to avoid an overly broad order, there was no discussion
of whether damages would have been an adequate remedy.
An example of a do-not-repeat Type IV order is that in Nazerali v
Mitchell prohibiting the defendant from “publishing on the Internet or
elsewhere the defamatory words described in paragraph 3 of the Reasons
for Judgment herein…”75 Note that the original injunction in Nazerali was
a Type IIb (do not defame) order, but this was narrowed on appeal to a Type
IV and, in addition, the geographical scope of the order was narrowed.76
Other courts go beyond the specific defamatory words and enjoin
publishing words with similar imputations to those found defamatory.77
Some courts explicitly acknowledge the need for an injunction due to a
likelihood of repetition. For example, in Cragg v Stephens the court states:
“I conclude that there is a reasonable apprehension that Ms. Stephens will
continue with her campaign against the plaintiffs and continue to defame
them.”78 Even in such circumstances, however, a court should consider
whether a finding of liability, perhaps with aggravated or punitive damages,
would be a sufficient deterrent and whether the harm from the anticipated
repetition justifies the use of injunctive relief.

permanent injunctions are often considered those that reflect a decision on the merits, as opposed to
interlocutory injunctions that are ordered before the merits are assessed.
72. St. Lewis, supra note 45 at para 13, citing Astley v Verdun, 2011 ONSC 3651 at para 21.
73. According to Chemerinsky: “there is a particular danger in allowing injunctions as a remedy in
defamation cases because of the inadequacy of money damages,” supra note 1 at 170.
74. Awan v Levant, 2014 ONSC 6890 at para 214, aff’d Awan v Levant, 2016 ONCA 970.
75. Nazerali v Mitchell, 2018 BCCA 104 at para 117.
76. Ibid at paras 103-109.
77. Eg Cragg v Stephens, 2010 BCSC 1177 at para 40.
78. Ibid.

308 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Finally, I wish to note one last reason for concern with regard to the
scope of defamation injunctions. Because plaintiffs usually draft orders,
there is a risk they will be inappropriately broad or vague unless opposing
counsel objects to their scope. Unsurprisingly, then, the broadest orders
seem to be made where defendants are self-represented or do not appear.
For example, of the ten Type I (i.e. do-not-say-anything-about-theplaintiff) injunctions in the data set, nine were ordered in cases with either
a self-represented defendant or where there was default judgment. Almost
three quarters (19/26) of Type II (do not defame) injunctions were ordered
in cases in which the defendant was self-represented or there was default
judgment. For Type IV, the narrowest and most justifiable injunctions,
only about half (9/17) involved a self-represented defendant or default
judgment. The numbers are small, and there is no evidence of statistical
significance.79 However, it would be unsurprising to find that injunction
orders are more narrowly tailored where defence counsel is involved. To
be sure, judges should not grant problematic orders even if there is no
defence counsel, but that seems more likely to happen in the absence of
an adversarial process. This suggests an even greater need for judges and
lawyers to carefully consider the proper scope of injunctions.
Conclusion
Type I injunctions, which prohibit saying anything about the plaintiff, are
clearly overbroad and should never be ordered. Yet they make up 16 per cent
of the injunctions in my study. Type II, which prohibit further defamation,
raise two issues. The first is that they may prohibit lawful conduct by
enjoining speech with defamatory meaning but that may be defensible.
These are called Type IIa injunctions. There may also be ambiguity as
to whether “defamatory” means “has a defamatory meaning” (Type IIa)
or “satisfies the elements of defamation and no defences are made out”
(which I call Type IIb). Assuming no ambiguity, Type IIb injunctions are
less problematic, in that they do not proscribe lawful speech. However,
they are vague in that they do not put the defendant on notice as to what
counts as defamation. Type II injunctions were 26/62 (42 per cent) of the
orders in the data set, with at least 7/62 (11 per cent) being Type IIa and
19/62 (31 per cent) Type IIb (or ambiguous as to whether Type IIa or b). It
is admittedly difficult to craft a narrower and effective order in cases where
defendants make a range of allegations. Yet in my view, this problem
79. A standard χ2 test of the null hypothesis (that there is no correlation between the type of injunction
and whether the defendant was self-represented or there was default judgment) was inconclusive.
χ2(2, 53) = 4.361, p = 0.1130. This means that there is no statistically significant relationship between
type of injunction and type of representation if the 0.05 threshold is used.
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only justifies the imposition of a Type IIb injunction where, in addition to
necessity, there is a real risk of serious reputational harm. Otherwise, the
preferable approach is to order damages and if the defendant continues
to defame the plaintiff, to bring a new action. Many (47 per cent) of the
Type IIb orders in the database were not ones in which a wide range of
allegations had been made; they were ones in which a narrower injunction
could have been crafted with little difficulty.
Type III orders, which prohibit saying x when x has not been found to
be defamatory, are rarely if ever justifiable. They constituted 15 per cent of
the data set. Type IV injunctions, which enjoin specific imputations found
to be defamatory, are sometimes justifiable. This is particularly so if they
are understood to require that the impugned speech be defamatory in the
context in which it is repeated. Further, there must be reason to believe the
defendant will continue to defame, despite a finding of liability, and this
would cause serious and irreparable harm. 27 per cent of the injunctions
in the data set were Type IV. The main conclusion of this article is that that
number should be much closer to 100 per cent.
The apparent correlation between overly broad injunctions and selfrepresentation or default judgment is worth investigating further as, if
established, it would suggest that defendants’ freedom of expression is
impaired to a greater extent when they don’t have legal counsel. And if
established, it would be problematic, particularly given that some courts
have stated that the inability to pay damages is a factor that could, on its
own, justify a permanent injunction.
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